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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Amici groups are public-interest law firms and public policy research
foundations dedicated to advancing individual liberty.

By publishing reports,

books, and articles, as well as through litigation, they have established themselves
at the forefront of the movement for limited government and free markets.
Randy E. Barnett is the Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory at
the Georgetown University Law Center. Barnett has taught constitutional law,
contracts, and criminal law, among other subjects, and has published more than
100 articles and reviews, plus nine books. He argued Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S.
1 (2005), before the Supreme Court and in 2008 was awarded a Guggenheim
Fellowship in Constitutional Studies.
This case concerns amici because it represents the federal government’s
most egregious attempt to exceed its constitutional powers.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The individual mandate exceeds Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce under existing doctrine. The outermost bounds of the Supreme Court’s
Commerce Clause jurisprudence—the “substantial effects” doctrine—stop
1

Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 29, both parties, through their respective counsel,
consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for any party authored this brief in
whole or in part and no party or party’s counsel made a monetary contribution to
fund its preparation or submission.
1

Congress from reaching intrastate non-economic activity regardless of its
consequences for the economy. Nor can Congress conscript an inactive person
into commerce even if it purports to do so pursuant to a broader regulatory scheme.
The Constitution does not permit Congress to compel citizens into economic
transactions to remedy the admitted shortcomings of a sloppily written law.
Although the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to adopt reasonable
means to regulate interstate commerce, it is not a blank check permitting Congress
to ignore constitutional limits by manufacturing necessities. Indeed, any law—
“necessary” or otherwise—that would transform Congress’s authority into a
generalized police power is unconstitutional.
While the government emphasizes the “uniqueness” of the health care
market and the wisdom of the legislation at issue, “this case is not about whether
the Act is wise or unwise . . . in fact, it is not really about our health care system at
all. It is principally about our federalist system, and . . . the Constitutional role of
the federal government.” Florida v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human
Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *6 (N.D. Fla.
Jan. 31, 2011).
What Congress has attempted here is literally unprecedented. As one district
court ruling for the government recognized, “in every Commerce Clause case
presented thus far, there has been some sort of activity. In this regard, the Health

2

Care Reform Act arguably presents an issue of first impression.” Thomas More
Law Center v. Obama, 720 F. Supp.2d 882, 893 (E.D. Mich. 2010).

Or, as the

lower court conceded: “previous Commerce Clause cases have all involved
physical activity, as opposed to mental activity, i.e. decision-making, [so] there is
little judicial guidance on whether the latter falls within Congress’s power.” Mead
v. Holder, No. 10-950 (GK), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at *55 (D.D.C. Feb.
22, 2011).
The Congressional Budget Office agrees: “The government has never
required people to buy any good or service as a condition of lawful residence in the
United States.” Cong. Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual
Mandate to Buy Health Insurance 1 (1994).

Nor has Congress ever before

imposed on every person a civil penalty for declining to buy a product. Even in
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 11 (1942), the federal government claimed “merely”
the power to regulate what farmers grew, not to force mandate that people become
farmers or buy farm products. 2

Even if not buying health insurance is an

“economic activity”—which of course would mean that every aspect of human life
is economic activity—there is no constitutional warrant for Congress to force
Americans to buy a particular good or service.
2

So, too, in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937), the federal government
successfully defended the constitutionality of the Social Security Act in part by
emphasizing that it did not compel economic activity. See id. at 621 (argument of
Mr. Jackson) (“No compliance with any scheme of federal regulation is involved.”)
3

Although the substantial effects test is often conceived as a Commerce
Clause doctrine, it actually interprets the Necessary and Proper Clause in the
context of the power to regulate commerce. Consequently, the limitations of this
doctrine mark the boundaries of necessity and propriety.

Because economic

mandates do not fall within this doctrine, it is unconstitutional to impose economic
mandates on the people under the guise of regulating interstate commerce.
Even if economic mandates are deemed “necessary,” however, they are not
“proper” because they unconstitutionally “commandeer” individuals. Economic
mandates alter the constitutional structure in an unprecedented way and thus do not
“consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).

ARGUMENT
I.

The Explicit Purpose of Article I is to Limit Congress’s Powers
That Congress is limited to its enumerated powers has been universally

accepted throughout American history. This sentiment was initially expressed in
the Declaration of Independence, which explains that governments do not grant
people rights, but, instead, are “instituted” to secure pre-existing rights.

The

Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776). Later, the Constitution’s framers
chose to grant Congress only “special and enumerated powers, and not . . . general

4

and unlimited powers.” Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the
United States 2 § 906 (1833). Indeed, the text of the Constitution clearly creates a
limited federal government of enumerated powers.

Unlike Article II, which

begins, “The executive Power shall be vested in a President,” or Article III, which
begins, “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court,” Article I begins, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress.” U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. Const. art. III, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. Const.
art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (emphasis added). This language expressly denies Congress any
generalized power, but authorizes only those powers that are “herein granted.” See
United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 596 (5th Cir. 2002) (“This clause necessarily
implies that some legislative powers are not ‘herein granted,’ foremost among
them ‘the police power, which the Founders denied the National Government.’”
(quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000)).

Even the

Commerce Clause was primarily meant to stop state regulatory abuse. West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 n.9 (1994) (“The ‘negative’ aspect of
the Commerce Clause was considered the more important by the ‘father of the
Constitution,’ James Madison.”).
During the ratification debates, Federalists emphasized that their opponents
needed not fear the new government because it would enjoy only limited powers.
See, e.g., The Federalist No. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (C. Rossiter, ed.,

5

1961) (“State governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which
. . . were not, by [the Constitution] exclusively delegated to the United States.”); id.
No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (“the proposed government[’s] . . . jurisdiction
extends to certain enumerated objects only.”); id. No. 45, at 328 (James Madison)
(“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are
few and defined.

Those which are to remain in the State governments are

numerous and indefinite.”); Oliver Ellsworth, Speech in the Connecticut Ratifying
Convention (Jan. 7, 1788), in 2 Jonathan Elliot, The Debates In The Several State
Conventions On The Adoption Of The Federal Constitution 196 (1859) (“The
Constitution defines the extent of the powers of the general government.”);
Archibald Maclaine, Remarks Before the Convention of the State of North
Carolina (July 28, 1788), in 4 id. at 140 (“The powers of Congress are limited and
enumerated. We . . . have given them those powers, but we do not say we have
given them more.”).
So critical was the principle of enumerated powers that many Founders
believed it rendered a Bill of Rights superfluous—and even dangerous—because it
might imply that the federal government’s authority was not limited to those
powers. See Federalist No. 84, supra, at 513-14 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Why
declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do?”).

To

explicitly refute this implication, and clarify that the federal government enjoys

6

only limited, enumerated powers, the Framers added the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments.

See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 488-92 (1965)

(Goldberg, J., concurring).
Given the Framers’ clear intent to create a limited federal government of
enumerated powers, it is unsurprising that the Supreme Court has consistently
reaffirmed that the federal government does not enjoy a general police power. See,
e.g., McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405; Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
1, 187 (1824); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 87 (1907); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997).

II.

The Individual Mandate Exceeds the Scope of the Necessary and Proper
Clause as Used to Execute the Power to Regulate Interstate Commerce
Under the “Substantial Effects” Doctrine
A. The “Substantial Effects” Doctrine Applies the Necessary and
Proper Clause to the Commerce Power and Allows Congress to
Use Its Regulatory Authority While Cabining That Authority
Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has asked whether a particular

“economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce” when considering
whether Congress can regulate it. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 25 (2005). The
New Deal cases which first developed the “substantial effects” doctrine, however,
found the authority for that doctrine not in the Commerce Clause itself but in its
execution via the Necessary and Proper Clause. Although often described as
expanding the definition of the word “commerce,” the cases show that the New
7

Deal Court actually asked whether federal regulation of the activity in question
was a necessary and proper means of exercising the regulatory power, because the
activity substantially affects that commerce. “Congress’s regulatory authority over
intrastate activities that are not themselves part of interstate commerce (including
activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce) derives from the
Necessary and Proper Clause.” Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing United
States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72, 78 (1838); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294,
301-02 (1964); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119
(1942); Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342, 353 (1914); United States v. E. C.
Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1895) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). Congress has never
been allowed to go further.
In United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), for example, the Court
considered Congress’s power to “prohibit the employment of workmen in the
production of goods ‘for interstate commerce’ at other than prescribed wages and
hours.” Id. at 105. Instead of stretching the definition of “commerce,” the Court
focused on how congressional power “extends to those activities intrastate which
so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of Congress over it as to
make regulation of them appropriate.” Id. The authority cited for this proposition
did not come from Gibbons—the Commerce Clause case cited throughout
Darby—but from McCulloch, the seminal Necessary and Proper Clause case.

8

A year later, in Wickard, the Court used the same reasoning: not redefining
“commerce,” but ruling that the challenged measures were a necessary and proper
means for regulating commerce. Like Darby, Wickard explicitly relied on the
Necessary and Proper Clause, citing McCulloch.

See 317 U.S. at 130, n.29.

Wickard did not expand the Commerce Clause, standing alone, to include the
power to regulate intrastate activity that, when aggregated, substantially affects
interstate commerce. Instead, “like Darby, Wickard is both a Commerce Clause
and a Necessary and Proper Clause case[,]” with the substantial effects doctrine
reaching Roscoe Filburn’s wheat growing via the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health
Insurance Mandate is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L.L. 581, 594 (2011). Thus the
aggregation principle can only apply to economic activities the regulation of which
is necessary and proper to effectuating Congress’s legitimate regulatory power.
Accordingly, the Court in Lopez found that aggregation could apply only to
economic activity: “Even Wickard, which is perhaps the most-far-reaching
example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic
activity in a way that possession of a gun in a school zone does not.” 514 U.S. at
560.

And in Morrison, the Court held that gender-motivated violence is not

economic activity and thus fell outside Congress’s power to regulate interstate
commerce. 529 U.S. at 613. In these and other decisions, the Court clarified the

9

substantial effects doctrine by setting the regulation of intrastate economic activity
(in certain contexts) as the absolute limit of federal power under the Commerce
and Necessary and Proper Clauses. “Where economic activity substantially affects
interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.” Lopez,
514 U.S. at 560 (emphasis added).
Conversely, non-economic activity cannot be regulated merely because it
affects interstate commerce through a “but-for causal chain,” or has, in the
aggregate,

“substantial

effects

on

employment,

production,

transit,

or

consumption.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615. The object of regulation must have a
“close and substantial relation to interstate commerce,” NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937), and that relationship must be qualitative, not
just quantitative. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 169 F.3d 820, 843
(4th Cir. 1999) (en banc), aff’d sub nom Morrison, supra; accord, United States v.
Bird, 124 F.3d 667, 677, n. 11 (5th Cir. 1997).
Adopting the distinction between economic and non-economic activity
allowed the Court to determine whether legislation is “necessary” under the
Necessary and Proper Clause without involving it in complex, potentially insoluble
evaluations of the “more or less of necessity or utility” of the law. Alexander
Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (February 23,
1791), in Hamilton: Writings 619 (J. Freeman, ed., 2001). This distinction limits
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congressional power when regulating intrastate economic activity to activities
closely connected to interstate commerce, thus withholding from Congress any
unconstitutional police powers, see, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567, preserving the
role of states in the federalist system, and minimizing the degree of judicial
involvement in utilitarian considerations that are outside the courts’ expertise.
In other words, to preserve the constitutional scheme of limited and
enumerated powers, the Court drew a judicially administrable line beyond which
Congress cannot go when choosing “necessary” means to execute its powers. The
substantial effects doctrine, limited by Lopez and Morrison to economic activities,
marks the outmost bounds of “necessity” under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
But if regulating intrastate economic activity can be a “necessary” means of
regulating interstate commerce as that term is understood under the Necessary and
Proper Clause, the obvious corollary is that regulating non-economic activity
cannot be “necessary,” regardless of its effect on interstate commerce. And a
power to regulate inactivity is even more remote from Congress’s power over
interstate commerce.
Most recently, in Raich, the Court found the cultivation of marijuana to be
an economic activity—indeed, a type of “manufacture,” 545 U.S. at 22—that
Congress could prohibit as a necessary and proper means of exercising of its
commerce power.

Raich explicitly adhered to the economic/non-economic
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distinction set out in Lopez and Morrison.

“Our case law firmly establishes

Congress’s power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic
‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” Id. at 17
(emphasis added).
Raich also rejected the government’s contention that it was Angel Raich’s or
Roscoe Filburn’s non-purchase of an interstate-traded commodity that subjected
them to federal law. See Barnett, supra, at 602-03. Instead, the Court invoked the
Webster’s Dictionary definition of “economics”—“the production, distribution,
and consumption of commodities,” Raich, 545 U.S. at 25—and refused to adopt
the sweeping theory the government advances here, that non-participation in the
marketplace is itself economic activity. This Court soon thereafter reaffirmed that
definition of “economic” when it held in United States v. Sullivan, 451 F.3d 884,
891 (D.C. Cir 2006), that child pornography is “quintessentially economic”
activity, “involv[ing] the manufacture and distribution of a commodity subject to
the forces of supply and demand,” and therefore properly subject to federal law.
B. Regulating Inactivity Transcends the Necessary and Proper
Clause’s Limits to the Commerce Clause
No precedent allows Congress to compel activity in the guise of regulating
commerce. Roscoe Filburn was actively growing wheat. Wickard, 317 U.S. at
114-15. The Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation was voluntarily engaged in the
economic activity of steelmaking. NLRB., 301 U.S. at 26. The Civil Rights Era
12

cases concerned parties that chose to engage in the economic activity of operating
a restaurant, Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 296, or a hotel, Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc.
v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 243 (1964). The Raich plaintiffs grew, processed,
and

consumed

medicinal

marijuana—all

voluntary

activities

the

Court

characterized as “manufactur[ing].” 545 U.S. at 22.
These cases fall into two general categories.

Id. at 35-38 (Scalia, J.,

concurring) (discussing the “two general circumstances” in which “the regulation
of intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation of
interstate commerce”). First, if persons voluntarily engage in economic activity,
for example by undertaking a commercial endeavor, Congress can regulate the
manner by which their activities are conducted. Such regulation of voluntary
economic activity may include conditional mandates such as recordkeeping
requirements. The second category, exemplified by Raich, concerns Congress’s
power to prohibit a type of commerce altogether—a power the Court has
recognized at least since Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903). In Sullivan,
therefore, this Court held that prohibiting intrastate possession of child
pornography is within Congress’s powers because there would otherwise be “a
significant gap in Congress’ comprehensive efforts to eliminate the market for
sexually exploitative uses of children.” 451 F.3d at 891.
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Under either theory, however, Congress can regulate or prohibit voluntary
economic actions, but cannot force people to undertake such actions—even if those
actions would have economic consequences.

The distinguishing characteristic

between a legitimate regulation within the constitutional scheme of enumerated
powers, and a limitless federal police power capable of compelling whatever
behavior Congress sees fit, is whether a person can, in principle, avoid federal
regulations by choosing not to engage in the regulated activity—i.e., not engaging
in an economic endeavor or obtaining contraband. No such option exists with
regard to the individual mandate; it cannot be avoided in principle. It is not,
therefore, a regulation of commercial activity, but an unprecedented command that
individuals engage in commerce.
C. The Comstock Factors That Are the Most Recent Articulation of
the Necessary and Proper Clause’s Limits Weigh Against the
Individual Mandate
In United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010), the Supreme Court
reiterated the limits of the Necessary and Proper Clause, noting that a law which
“confers on Congress a general ‘police power, which the Founders denied the
National Government and reposed in the States’” would not be necessary and
proper. Id. at 1964 (quoting Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618). The Comstock Court
upheld the federal civil commitment law at issue after weighing five factors: (1)
the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long history of federal
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involvement in criminal prosecution, (3) the “sound reasons” for the statute given
the government’s public safety goal, (4) “the statute’s accommodation of state
interests” and (5) its narrow scope. Id. at 1965.
The Court avoided referring to these factors as a “test”; nor did it explain
how they inter-relate, which weigh most heavily, or what to do when different
factors point in different directions. See Ilya Shapiro and Trevor Burrus, Not
Necessarily Proper: Comstock’s Errors and Limitations, 61 Syracuse L. Rev. 413,
415 (2011). Nevertheless, most of these factors—the lack of a deep history of
federal involvement, PPACA’s failure to accommodate state interests, and its
extraordinarily broad scope—weigh against the constitutionality of the individual
mandate. See Ilya Somin, Taking Stock of Comstock: The Necessary and Proper
Clause and the Limits of Federal Power, 2009-10 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 239, 260-67
(2010) (assessing Comstock’s implications on PPACA litigation).
First, although the Necessary and Proper Clause is “broad” in that it gives
Congress leeway to choose the means for executing legitimate ends, it is not a
grant of potentially endless power. Recall from McCulloch that only those means
which are “within the scope of the constitution . . . which are not prohibited, [and
which] consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421-23.

Cf. Gary Lawson and Patricia B. Granger, The

“Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of The
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Sweeping Clause, 43 Duke L.J. 267, 297 (1993) (“executory laws must be
consistent with principles of separation of powers, principles of federalism, and
individual rights.”). The breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause thus does not
warrant extending federal reach in a manner that contradicts fundamental
constitutional principles like federalism and enumerated powers. Nor does the
“breadth of the Clause” factor vary from case to case; it is a constant.
Second, there is no “long history” of federal involvement here, unlike in
Comstock. Not only is the individual mandate without parallel in constitutional
history, but federal involvement in private health insurance is an entirely modern
phenomenon. See, e.g., Jeannie Jacobs Kronenfeld, The Changing Federal Role in
U.S. Health Care Policy 67 (1997) (“[T]he bulk of the federal health legislation
that has health impact . . . has actually been passed in the past 50 or so years.”).
Third, the individual mandate does not accommodate state interests. The
civil commitment provision challenged in Comstock allowed states to assert
authority over any individual committed under it, and indeed to prevent federal
detention at the outset.

130 S. Ct. at 1962-63.

The individual mandate, by

contrast, does not allow states to assert authority or prevent the compulsory
purchase of health insurance. Instead, it ejects states from their role as the primary
authority for regulating citizens’ health insurance purchases. And with over half
the states suing to have PPACA declared unconstitutional, and many enacting
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legislation to protect citizens from the individual mandate, it is clear that the states
do not believe their interests are being accommodated.
Finally, the individual mandate is not narrow in scope. It unavoidably
applies to every resident American, excepting only the impoverished, and
prescribes a blanket rule: buy insurance or pay a fine. It asserts federal authority
over not engaging in any activity that has ultimate economic consequences—
hardly a “narrow” proposition.
The individual mandate fails the Comstock factors and therefore cannot pass
muster under the Necessary and Proper Clause. It conflicts with fundamental
principles of limited federal power, intrudes on traditional state autonomy, and
essentially converts Congress’ power to regulate commerce into a generalized
police power with no principled limit. The Constitution does not authorize such
power either directly or by implication.

III.

The Individual Mandate Cannot be Justified as an “Essential Part of a
Broader Regulatory Scheme” Because Congress Cannot Regulate
Inactivity
Unable to justify the individual mandate under existing Commerce Clause or

Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine (let alone the fallback taxing power theories
not addressed here), the government has resorted to a new theory: that the
Necessary and Proper Clause authorizes Congress to mandate economic activity

17

when doing so is an essential part of a broader regulatory scheme. In other words,
while not itself a regulation of interstate commerce, or a regulation of intrastate
economic activity, or even a regulation of intrastate non-economic activity, the
individual mandate is a necessary and proper means of exercising the lawful ends
of regulating the interstate health insurance industry.
The government’s argument rests on a sentence from Lopez and a concurring
opinion by Justice Scalia in Raich that actually only identified circumstances in
which Congress may reach wholly intrastate non-economic activity. See Raich,
545 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our cases show that the regulation of
intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation of interstate
commerce in two general circumstances.” (emphasis added)). The first of these
circumstances included the substantial effects doctrine, which is limited to
reaching intrastate economic activity.

The second is the proposition that

“Congress may regulate even non-economic local activity if that regulation is a
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.” Id. at 37
(emphasis added).

These precedents do not justify expanding Congress’s

regulatory authority to allow it to compel economic activity.
A. Inactivity Is Not a Type of Activity
The government and the lower courts ruling in its favor have implicitly
acknowledged that Congress can regulate only “activity” by redefining that word
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to include the making of an “economic decision,” or a decision not to act or to
remain uninsured, or numerous other “active” articulations of the status of not
owning health insurance. For example, the decision below described the difference
between activity and inactivity as “pure semantics,” and held that Congress can
regulate any “mental activity, i.e., decision-making,” which has an ultimate
economic effect. Mead, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18592, at *60. If a “decision” not
to act is a federally regulable action, however, then inactivity is transformed into
activity by a linguistic alchemy that has at least three weaknesses.
First, the difference between activity and inactivity—or acts and
omissions—is a genuine and long-respected one. See, e.g., Prosser and Keeton on
the Law of Torts § 56 at 373 (5th ed. 1984) (“there runs through much of the law a
distinction between action and inaction.”). It is a basic principle of tort law, for
example, that one has no duty to act, and cannot generally be punished for
nonfeasance, but has only a duty to act reasonably, and not commit misfeasance.
See, e.g., McFarlane v. Sheridan Square Press, 91 F.3d 1501, 1511 (D.C. Cir.
1996). So too in criminal law one cannot generally be convicted without engaging
in some activity. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 16 (1994) (the law
“does not punish mere thought”); United States v. Rhone, 864 F.2d 832, 835 (D.C.
Cir. 1989). The activity/inactivity distinction is intuitively obvious and understood
by the ordinary person. It is also the foundation of moral philosophy relevant to
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debates over health care law and policy. See, e.g., Philippa Foot, Killing and
Letting Die, in Moral Dilemmas 78-87 (2002) (distinguishing between prohibited
killing and allowable withholding of care). Contrary to the district court’s holding,
it is the redefinition of inactivity as a type of activity that is a semantic trick.
Second, while activity means engaging in a particular, definite act, inactivity
means not engaging in a literally infinite set of acts. At any instant, there are
innumerable economic transactions in which one is not entering.

To allow

Congress discretionary power to impose compulsory economic mandates within
this infinite set of inactions—without constitutional constraint—would amount to
granting the federal government a plenary and unlimited police power of the sort
the Constitution specifically withholds. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618-19 (quoting
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (“The Constitution ... withhold[s] from Congress a plenary
police power”); and Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584-585 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[W]e
always have rejected readings of the Commerce Clause and the scope of federal
power that would permit Congress to exercise a police power.”).
Finally, if inaction is deemed “economic” because of its economic effects,
then the distinction between economic and non-economic activity established in
Lopez and reaffirmed in Morrison and Raich would collapse. Indeed, Lopez and
Morrison stand for the proposition that Congress may not regulate intrastate noneconomic activities even if, in the aggregate, they have substantial effects on
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interstate commerce. But any class of activity or inactivity, in the aggregate, can
be said to have some economic consequences. To define inactivity as an economic
activity would destroy the line the Supreme Court has time and again drawn
between the intrastate economic activity that Congress may reach and the intrastate
non-economic activity it may not.

This Court should not so disregard the

overwhelming precedent governing the scope of the Commerce and Necessary and
Proper Clauses.
B. The Activity/Inactivity Distinction Provides Judicially
Manageable Standards with a Minimum of Judicial Policymaking
There must be some principled limit to Congress’s regulatory authority to
prevent it from laying claim to a general police power. The most obvious line to
draw is one between regulating activity—whether economic or non-economic—
and inactivity.

Such a distinction provides a judicially administrable limiting

principle with a minimum of judicial intrusion into complicated political or
economic analysis. It is also consistent with existing precedent. In Lopez, the
Court observed that Congress can regulate intrastate non-economic activity when
doing so is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were
regulated.” 514 U.S. at 561 (emphasis added). In Raich, Justice Scalia proposed
that “Congress may regulate even non-economic local activity if that regulation is a
necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.” 545 U.S. at 37
21

(emphasis added). Indeed, in his Raich opinion, Justice Scalia used the word
“activity” or “activities” 42 times. See Jason Mazzone, Can Congress Force You
to Be Healthy? N.Y. Times, Dec. 16, 2010, at A39. There is good reason to doubt
that Justice Scalia—who has called the Necessary and Proper Clause “the last, best
hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action,” Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997) (Scalia, J.)—would extend his proposed doctrine to reach
inactivity.

See also Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1983 (Thomas and Scalia, JJ.,

dissenting).
Limiting Congress to regulating or prohibiting activity under both the
“substantial effects” and the “essential to a broader regulatory scheme” doctrines
would serve the same general purpose as the economic/non-economic distinction:
ensuring that uses of the Necessary and Proper Clause to execute the commerce
power are truly incidental to that power and not remote, or mere “pretext[s]” for
“the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government.” McCulloch, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 423. However imperfect, some such line must be drawn to
preserve Article I’s structure of enumerated and therefore limited powers. See
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 575 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Although the resolution of
specific cases has proved difficult, we have derived from the Constitution
workable standards to assist in preserving separation of powers and checks and
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balances.”). Because accepting the government’s theory in this case would
effectively demolish that structure, that theory is constitutionally unsatisfactory.
Instead of offering a limiting principle to its asserted power to compel
activity as an essential part of a broader regulatory scheme, the government argues
that the health insurance business is “unique” in various respects. See, e.g., Brief
for Appellants at 7-11, Florida v. United States Dep’t of Health & Human Servs.,
Nos. 11-11021 & 11-11067 (11th Cir. Apr. 1, 2011).

But examining the

“uniqueness” of the regulated market and the problems Congress chose to
ameliorate is precisely the sort of inquiry into the “more or less necessity” of a
measure that the Supreme Court has always rejected as outside the judiciary’s
proper sphere. Courts must “identify a mode of analysis that allows Congress to
regulate more than nothing (by declining to reduce each case to its litigants) and
less than everything (by declining to let Congress set the terms of analysis).”
Raich, 545 U.S at 47-48 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
In the course of pointing to one particular “unique” aspect of health care, the
government claims that the individual mandate is no different than requiring the
advance purchase of health care. See, e.g., Brief for Appellants at 27, Florida v.
HHS, supra. Nearly everyone ultimately consumes health care—an economic
act—so the federal government can direct that health care be (pre-)purchased now,
by obtaining insurance, rather than later when the medical bill comes due. Id.
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That argument does not provide a constitutional limit on Congress’s power.
Virtually all forms of insurance represent timing decisions—paying up front for
burial costs, loss of life, disability, supplemental income, credit default, business
interruption, and more. See Florida, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822, at *100-01
(discussing cost-shifting and timing decisions in all insurance markets). Only a
federal government of unbounded powers could mandate that every American
insure against such risks. Id. at *102 (“There will be no stopping point if that
should be deemed the equivalent of activity for Commerce Clause purposes.”).
The government’s “unique market” argument thus provides no legal limit on
federal authority, instead inviting standardless judicial examination of “how
necessary” a congressional action is. Courts should not be drawn into determining
whether a particular market is “unique” or whether it “makes sense” to require that
the product be paid for at one time or another.
Enforcing the activity/inactivity distinction, by contrast, requires no such
judicial policymaking and would affect no other existing law. Congress could
have reformed the health care system in many ways, for better or worse—including
even a Medicare-for-Everyone “single payer” scheme—that would have been
legally unassailable under existing Commerce Clause doctrine. That it chose a
scheme so flawed as to require otherwise unconstitutional patches to make it
function does not make those “essential” provisions automatically constitutional.
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IV.

The Individual Mandate Is Not “Proper” Under the Necessary and
Proper Clause Because It Constitutes a “Commandeering of the People”
The Supreme Court, in two cases presenting then-unprecedented assertions

of power under the Commerce Clause, stated that Congress cannot use this power
to mandate or “commandeer” state legislatures and executive officers. Printz,
supra; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). As the Court explained,
doing so would be “fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of
dual sovereignty,” and therefore improper under our federalist system. Printz, 521
U.S. at 935. The source of “residual state sovereignty” is the Tenth Amendment,
which reiterates that the Constitution confers upon Congress “not all governmental
powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones.” Id. at 919. The mandate at issue in
Printz, even if necessary, thus could not be justified under the Necessary and
Proper Clause:

“When a ‘la[w]…for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce

Clause violates the principle of state sovereignty reflected in” the Tenth
Amendment and other constitutional provisions, “it is not a ‘La[w] . . . proper for
carrying into execution the Commerce Clause.’” Id. at 923-24 (quoting U.S. Const.
art. I, § 8, cl. 18) (emphasis added).
But the Tenth Amendment also recognizes that the people of the United
States are sovereign: “The powers not delegated by the Constitution to the United
States, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or
to the people.” U.S. Const. amend. X (emphasis added). In this way, the text of
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the Tenth Amendment protects not just state sovereignty, but also popular
sovereignty. Just as mandating that states take action is improper commandeering,
so too is mandating that individual citizens enter into transactions with private
companies.

This amounts to what Prof. Barnett has called an improper

“commandeering of the people.” Supra at 621-34.
As Chief Justice John Jay noted in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419,
471-72 (1793), the people are “truly the sovereigns of the country,” and elected
officials merely their deputies, exercising delegated authority. Fellow Founder
James Wilson agreed, recognizing that sovereignty starts with the individual
citizen: “If one free man, an original sovereign, may do all this; why may not an
aggregate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this likewise?” Id. at
456 (emphasis added). Although the Eleventh Amendment reversed the outcome
of Chisholm and the Supreme Court has interpreted that Amendment as
establishing state sovereignty, the Court has never repudiated the priority of
popular sovereignty. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[I]n our
system, while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government,
sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for whom all government
exists and acts.”); accord Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967) (“In our
country the people are sovereign and the Government cannot sever its relationship
to the people by taking away their citizenship.”).
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Thus, just as the Constitution disallows the “commandeering” of states as a
means of regulating interstate commerce, it also bars a “commandeering of the
people” for this purpose. The very few mandates imposed on the people by the
federal government either derive from other clauses of the Constitution—such as
responding to censuses, U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3, serving on juries, U.S. Const.
amend. VI & VII, or paying income taxes, U.S. Const. amend. XVI—or rest on the
fundamental pre-existing duties that citizens owe that government.

See, e.g.,

Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918) (relying on the “supreme and
noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the nation” to
reject a Thirteenth Amendment claim).

But citizens are not owned by the

government and cannot be generally presumed to be subject to an indefinite federal
command.

Various express provisions of the Constitution reflect this anti-

commandeering principle. For example, persons may not be mandated to quarter
soldiers in their homes in time of peace, to testify against themselves, to labor for
another, or to yield up other rights not specifically enumerated in the Constitution.
U.S. Const. amends. III, V, IX, XIII. In the United States there is not even a duty
to vote. There is certainly no comparable pre-existing “supreme and noble duty”
to engage in economic activity whenever doing so would be convenient to a
congressional regulation of commerce. To hold otherwise would be to deprive the
people of the United States of the residual sovereignty recognized in the Tenth
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Amendment and to make them the servants, rather than the masters, of Congress.
Cf. The Federalist No. 78 supra, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[to say] that the
legislative body are themselves the constitutional judges of their own powers, and
that the construction they put upon them is conclusive upon other departments”
would “be to affirm that the deputy is greater than the principal; that the servant is
above his master.”).
There are also pragmatic reasons to believe that the individual mandate is
not “proper.” In New York, Justice O’Connor explained that mandates on states are
improper because, “where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it
may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the
federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from
the electoral ramifications of their decision.” 505 U.S. at 169. That proposition
applies to the commandeering of individuals as well: the individual mandate has
allowed Congress and the president to escape political accountability for what
amounts to a tax increase on persons making less than $250,000 per year by
compelling them to make payments directly to private companies. It is the evasion
of political accountability that explains why the mandate was formulated as a
regulatory “requirement” enforced by a “penalty.”
The individual mandate crosses the fundamental line between limited
constitutional government and limitless power cabined only by the Congress’

28

political will—which is to say, not cabined at all. Congress would then be the sole
judge of the extent of its own authority—a proposition the Founders explicitly and
repeatedly denied and which no federal court has ever endorsed.
In Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603, 617-18 (1870), for example,
the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that Congress is the sole judge of what
acts are necessary and proper to carrying out its enumerated powers. To admit that
Congress has such unreviewable discretion,
and, then, to exercise absolutely and without liability to question, in
cases involving private rights, the powers thus determined to [be
“necessary and proper”], would completely change the nature of
American government. It would convert the government, which the
people ordained as a government of limited powers, into a
government of unlimited powers…. It would obliterate every
criterion which this court, speaking through the venerated Chief
Justice [Marshall] in [McCulloch], established for the determination
of the question whether legislative acts are constitutional or
unconstitutional.
If the word “proper” is to be more than dead letter, it must at least mean that
acts which destroy the very purpose of Article I—to enumerate and therefore limit
the powers of Congress—are improper. If the federal power to enact economic
mandates were upheld here, Congress would be free to require anything of the
citizenry so long as it was part of a national regulatory plan. Unsupported by any
fundamental, preexisting, or traditional duty of citizenship, imposing “economic
mandates” on the people is improper, both in the lay and constitutional senses of
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that word. Allowing Congress to exercise such power would convert it from a
government of delegated powers into one of general and unlimited authority.

CONCLUSION
For the first time in American history, the federal government has attempted
to “commandeer the people” by imposing on them an “economic mandate” not
derived from pre-existing duties of citizenship. Such economic mandates cannot
be justified by existing Supreme Court doctrines defining and limiting the powers
of Congress.

Upholding the power to impose economic mandates “would

fundamentally alter the relationship of the federal government to the states and the
people; nobody would ever again be able to claim plausibly that the Constitution
limits federal power.” Ilya Shapiro, State Suits Against Health Reform Are Well
Grounded in Law—and Pose Serious Challenges, 29 Health Affairs 1229, 1232
(June 2010).
As one district court recognized, “[n]ever before has the Commerce Clause
and the associated Necessary and Proper Clause been extended this far.” Virginia
v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 612 (E.D. Va. 2010). Only the Supreme Court is
empowered to reconsider the outer bounds of federal power, so the district court
here improperly interpreted the existing doctrinal limits in this area. Accordingly,
amici respectfully ask this Court to reverse the district court.
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